A Perfect Peace Storm — II

The Agha & Malley article in the May 1 issue of The New York Review of Books, after a compelling critique of the Bush administration’s proposed “shelf agreement,” proposes two “alternative paths” to “a workable Israeli-Palestinian political agreement.” 

The first “path” is the one Jimmy Carter ignominiously traveled this week: engage Hamas.  Forget the Roadmap requirement that Hamas be dismantled.  Forget the Quartet demand that Hamas recognize Israel, renounce terrorism and commit itself to previous Palestinian agreements. Impose no conditions at all.

Malley, who served as President Clinton’s special assistant for Arab-Israeli affairs, once wrote that Yasser Arafat saw in every ultimatum “a last demand before the next concession.”  Malley has now become the latest example of the efficacy of this Palestinian approach.  Wait long enough, and Roadmap requirements for final status negotiations will be waived.  Just say no, and Quartet conditions for diplomatic engagement will eventually wither.

The second “path” Agha & Malley suggest is engaging Syria — again without conditions, and even without any realistic prospects of success.  Their proposal, in their own words, is “far-fetched:”

Syria is unlikely to sever its thirty-year relationship with Tehran, cut off its principal Lebanese ally and main source of influence in that country, or abandon its Palestinian partners in the PLO and among the Islamists.

These connections, built over years, have supported Syrian strategic and political interests on a host of regional issues –Iraq, Lebanon, Turkey, the Gulf, as well as economic and intelligence matters — of which the conflict with Israel is only one.

Syria will not sacrifice its influence in the region for the sake of a newly minted agreement with Israel or the uncertain prospects of resumed contacts with the US.

Agha & Malley nevertheless recommend Israeli-Syrian talks because an agreement would send “signals” that “winds are shifting.”

The underlying theme of the Agha & Malley “paths” is that nothing is more important than a peace agreement. Thus if the conditions set for final status negotiations or diplomatic engagement cannot be met, the conditions become the obstacle to peace and must be overcome. The ultimatum becomes the next concession, as will the ultimatum after that.