Hillel Halkin, in “Mr. Olmert Without Tears,” on how Ehud Olmert’s peacemaking was even worse than his failed war in
Lebanon
[T]he deeper into trouble he got because of the corruption charges against him, the more the [peace process] ploy became a life raft that he clung to in the hope that no one would throw a dedicated peacemaker overboard.
And to keep the raft afloat, he began to make concession after concession on both the Palestinian and Syrian fronts without getting anything substantial in return, while in the bargain helping the Syrian regime to extricate itself from its international isolation. . . .
No matter how Israel’s governments legitimately try to argue that they are not bound by offers Mr. Olmert has made to re-divide Jerusalem, to give dozens of square kilometers of Israel’s territory to a Palestinian state, to re-admit a to-be-negotiated number of Palestinian refugees, and to withdraw from the entire Golan Heights, the international community, let alone the Arab states, will from now on regard these as Israel’s positions that must not be backtracked from.
Livni will be even worse. In Ari Shavit’s lengthy December 2006 interview in Haaretz, she called the Lebanon war a military failure but a “diplomatic success” and said she hoped to follow it with another one with the Palestinians. Here is how Shavit (a man of the left, who supported the Gaza disengagement) summarized his interview:
Apparently the idea is as follows: to promote a diplomatic process by means of a package of gestures that includes transferring money to the Palestinians, releasing prisoners and bringing in the Egyptians to help stop the arms smuggling on the Philadelphi route. Then, to conduct negotiations with Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas about the second stage of the road map and about the establishment of a Palestinian state within interim borders. Then, to convene the moderate Arab countries to give him backing. And then, to hold elections in the PA in which the moderates will have a reasonable chance because they will be able to offer the Palestinian public a clear and existing political horizon. . . .
Can this plan be implemented? Isn’t it totally divorced from reality? The foreign minister is very careful not to mention any details, but she radiates optimism. She is full of self-confidence, is Livni. Energetic. U pon leaving a meeting with hostile European MPs, she is full of adrenaline. The challenges with which she presented them. The arguments with which she surprised them. The way in which she convinced them that they themselves don’t want to return to the 1967 lines. And when she finally sits down in her armchair and treats herself to some chocolate, Livni tries to overcome the directness that is gushing from her and to become formal once again. To become a stateswoman.
What has happened since makes “totally divorced from reality” seem diplomatic. She went straight to the third stage of the Roadmap, without even a commitment from the Mayor of Ramallah that he would support Israel as a Jewish state at the end of the process.
Livni is the non-corrupt Olmert, championing his premature and unproductive concessions for reasons worse than corruption: she actually believed in them, and in her ability to produce another diplomatic “success,” just like Lebanon. Halkin ended his column with these words:
It is indeed hard to feel sorry for [Olmert]. It is easier to feel sorry for the country that has been led by him.
As Livni undertakes her efforts to become Prime Minister without a new election, it may become even easier.