Today is the 15th anniversary of the death of
Elliot Jager recalls in the Jerusalem Post — in an article that is worth reading in its entirety — that Begin was relentlessly attacked from the very beginning:
Never before had an Israeli premier been so beleaguered, so vilified, so undermined by an alliance of left-wing domestic opponents, the Jewish Diaspora establishment, an implacable White House led by Jimmy Carter and a spiteful international media.
His foes found him "too Jewish," and his idea of trading "peace for peace" a non-starter. Thomas L. Friedman, who reported for The
New York Times, first from Beirut and then from Jerusalem during the Begin years, later thus encapsulated the left-wing attitude toward Begin: "What made Begin . . . dangerous was that his fantasies about power were combined with a self-perception of being a victim. . . . Begin always reminded me of Bernhard Goetz, the white Manhattanite who shot four black youths he thought were about to mug him on the New York subway… [Begin] was Bernhard Goetz with an F-15." . . .
To a media that wouldn’t give him the time of day [Begin] sought to make the legal, historical and strategic case for calling the territories Jewish. And, anyway, he didn’t think sacrificing the West Bank and
Gaza would bring peace; he was convinced that the Arabs had not accepted the idea of a sovereign Jewish state anywhere in the land.
By the time Begin took office, there were as many as 80 communities that prior Labor governments had established as beyond the Green Line (including Ma’aleh Adumim, Kiryat Arba, Gush Etzion and others) — for strategic reasons, or to solidify
Begin took the settlement project even further, since he believed Jews had a right to live in Judea and
Begin was not going to "tolerate" settlements; he was going to make building them government policy. And this the
US administration could not tolerate because it went against bedrock US policy: Israel would trade land for peace, and if there was no West Bank to trade — somewhere down the line when the Arabs would presumably be willing to take it — there would be no possibility of peace. . . .
WHAT FOLLOWED was a scenario of political manipulation aimed at forcing Begin to change his policies or, better yet, returning the government to Labor. It was to be a multi-pronged effort: The White House would signal that the US-Israel relationship was jeopardized by Begin’s election. The American Jewish leadership would radically "disassociate" its support for Israel from Begin’s West Bank policies. And inside
Israel, a campaign of street demonstrations and newspaper ads would create the impression that Begin’s ideas were outside the mainstream.
Carter’s White House immediately issued a "Notice to the Press" to set the "historical record" straight. Based on what we now know about Carter, his initial response to Begin’s election is telling. You have to remember that in 1977 the Palestinian leadership wasn’t even pretending to compromise. The possibility of cutting a West Bank deal with
Jordan was still out there. No one was pushing a Palestinian state, and only the Arabs and the extreme Left embraced the "right of return."
But the White House engaged in a psychological campaign against Begin. If he had the hutzpa to claim that the West Bank was disputed, the White House would remind the world that
Israel itself was disputed. And so it recalled: "UN General Assembly Resolution 181… [which] provided for the recognition of a Jewish and an Arab state in Palestine, and UN GA Resolution 194… [which] endorsed the [Palestinian Arab] right to return to their homes or choose compensation for lost property…"
Jager writes that he will “leave a fuller description of the appalling treatment Begin received at the hands of Carter, the prestige media, and much of the American Jewish leadership for another time.” It is a story that has not yet been fully told, nor widely understood.
For now, it is worth recalling this excerpt from Kenneth Stein’s January 25, 2007 article, in which he noted (from personal knowledge) that “[Carter’s] animus toward the late Israeli leader is limitless.” Stein recounted a telling example of how Carter treated Begin:
During the difficult negotiations between
Egypt and Israel, Carter and his advisers tried to get Sadat to engage in a collusive scheme: They would encourage Sadat to make "deliberately exaggerated" demands. The White House would then intervene to "compel" Cairo to scale back its demands in exchange for Israeli concessions. . . .
In 1983, the first time Begin met Carter after both had left office, Begin was icy toward the ex-president. Carter surmised that he may have "aggravated him [Begin] more than usual." Begin’s personal secretary later said Begin was angry with what he had learned in the books by Brzezinski and National Security Council staff member William B. Quandt about Carter’s behind-the-scenes maneuvering. . . . On our 1987 trip to
Israel, Begin refused to see Carter, citing health reasons, but Begin’s personal secretary told me it was because of the way Carter had treated Begin.
In the current issue of COMMENTARY, Hillel Halkin recounts the dead end to which the post-Begin “peace process” has led under a series of prime ministers — Rabin (Oslo), Barak (Camp David), Sharon (the Road Map and disengagement) and Olmert (convergence). Halkin concludes with the observation that Israelis “have to recover a belief in the fundamental justice of their cause that many of them, seeing their country repeatedly indicted for its reputed sins, have lost.”
Perhaps they need a leader like Menachem Begin.