Norman Podhoretz went to Israel last month as part of a small group associated with the Hudson Institute to receive a series of briefings on the state of affairs in Israel. He has written an extraordinary article for the April issue of Commentary on the briefings.
It is a remarkable piece of literary writing, political history and strategic thinking. We’re going to need a few posts to digest it. But let’s start with the turning point in the intifada:
Things began to change only in 2001, when Sharon, deciding that enough was enough, refused to have anything further to do with Arafat, and finally penned him up in his compound in Ramallah.
At first Bush had permitted himself to be influenced by the State Department’s kneejerk disapproval of this move. But then the Israelis intercepted the Karine A, a ship trying — in violation of a cease-fire which had been brokered by an American envoy — to smuggle arms into the hands of the Palestinians.
Questioned over the phone by Bush, Arafat claimed that he knew nothing about any such ship, and accused Israel of trumping up the incident as an excuse to break the cease-fire.
This was exactly the kind of con game Arafat had been playing with perfect success ever since assuming his new persona as a pursuer of peace. But like practically everyone else in the world, Arafat had "misunderestimated" George W. Bush.
Not only did Bush refuse the sucker bait, but — aware of the overwhelming evidence proving that the Karine A had been a PA operation from start to finish, and disgusted by being told so blatant a lie in a one-on-one conversation — he now joined Sharon in refusing to have anything to do with Arafat.
It was the isolation of Arafat, combined with the launching of Sharon’s new strategy and the green light Bush gave to it, that turned the tide against the second intifada.
Compare Bush’s reaction to Arafat with that of Bill Clinton — who as late as June of last year was telling Israel it would have to deal with Arafat if it wanted peace.
Podhoretz’s review of Bush’s performance is an important part of his article, and a critical part of Podhoretz’s ultimate conclusions about the future. This is essential reading. (Hat tip: RealClearPolitics).