Reports from Gaza

Sever Plocker, a commentator on economic and political affairs, as well as Deputy Editor at Yediot Ahronot, writes that the withdrawal from Gaza has not been developing the way it was marketed to the Israeli public:

Almost nothing has materialized in the way pullout supporters promised us would happen.

The Gaza Strip did not calm down and the Palestinian Authority did not take matters there into its own hands in order to establish the Middle Eastern Hong Kong. Gaza is a no-man’s land, the country of nobody. The Strip lacks a civilian regime, no currency, no enforcement of law and order, and most of the system tasked with providing the population with basic services is paralyzed, aside from the one run by the United Nations.

Armed gangs rule the narrow, derelict refugee camp streets. The only manufacturing activity is the industry of flying iron tubes that are launched to short distances. . . .

The handing over of the border crossing with Egypt to Palestinian control also failed to lead to the expected results. The border is rather porous, checks are inadequate, and smuggling is rampant. There too, the Palestinians failed to implement their sovereignty.

Egyptian Border Guard troops received one kind of order:  Preventing at any price the turning of Gaza into part of Egypt. They’re carrying out this job, but nothing beyond.

The Palestinian Authority did not use the months between Israel’s withdrawal and the general elections in order to reinforce its hold among Gaza residents. It was busy with internal power struggles. . . .

For a while Gaza became Hamas land. Now, it’s not even that: In fact, even the official Hamas has given up in the face of Gaza’s collapse and left it to face its destiny.

And Israel, even though it removed its army and settlements, and even though it closed down the crossings to the movement of goods, is still stuck with Gaza as if it was a huge bone in its throat. . . .

The responsibly over it, in the eyes of the world and in some ways in our own view, has not been lifted from Israel. . . . The thousands of good jobs at the settlements have disappeared, and instead unemployment and poverty grew. The ruins of Israeli communities were not cleared, even though the Israeli government pledged (or rather, was forced to) pay for the clearing. It’s unclear who the guilty party is, the PA, or Egypt, or International groups.

Did Israel gain from the disengagement? Less than what its planners hoped. The United States didn’t grant us even one cent in economic aid, even though in various phases of preparation for the withdrawal and upon the pullout, much was said about a special USD 2 billion grant. As of today, there’s no grant. . . .

Ehud Olmert may discover that the attitude to a Sharon-made disengagement is very different than the world’s approach to an Olmert-made one. The first one fascinated the world because it appeared to be a personal sea change by a hawkish leader tired of war. The second one, Olmert’s pullout, would look like — and already looks like — as an act by a centrist politician whose party received about a quarter of the vote in the recent elections. . . .

The fact that the post-disengagement reality does not resemble the earlier scenarios and predictions should make Ehud Olmert rethink his diplomatic plans.

Would Israel really be able to unilaterally set its border vis-à-vis the Palestinians, a border they or the world would not accept? Would Israel be able to "converge" into "settlement blocs" in the West Bank and annex them? Who would finance such a move, which would cost tens of billions of shekels and not be perceived as a solution to anything? Who would prevent a tragic rift among the people? And what would be left behind in Palestine following a pretend-Israeli-withdrawal coupled with pretend-annexation?

David Warren reports on the lessons from Gaza:

As more extensive reports in Israel have made clear, Gaza has now become a bigger security problem for Israel than it ever was during the nearly four decades that Jewish settlements were established there. This is because the need to defend the settlements gave the IDF a forward position within Gaza, and better local intelligence. They could respond more immediately to developing threats. Now they have been withdrawn from Gaza, they must watch the enemy’s preparations only electronically.

It has become clear that Al Qaeda and other terror affiliates are now setting up shop in Gaza at the invitation of both Hamas and Fatah. This could not have happened, with the IDF still there.

The withdrawal from Gaza was a small thing, however, in comparison to the impending withdrawal of forward Israeli settlements from the West Bank. Some 80,000 Israelis, most of whom have lived there more than a generation, will be removed behind “more defensible lines”. The acting prime minister, Ehud Olmert, is hoping to get international, or at least American, recognition for the borders behind which they are withdrawn. Good luck to him. Israel has never been repaid, except with more violence, for any of its tactical retreats, and no other fate is foreseeable.

The abandonment of forward positions in the West Bank will repeat the mistake in Gaza, but on a much larger scale, while the sight of ten-thousands of Israelis being evicted from their homes, by their own army, will tear at the fabric of Israeli society. . . . The whole idea of “withdrawing behind more defensible borders” is built upon illusion.

(Hat tips:  Ted Belman, Michelle Malkin and Ami Isseroff)