The Law of Unintended Consequences

 The Law of Unintended Consequences

Haaertz reports on Condoleezza Rice’s talks with Israeli officials over the weekend:

Rice said that she is very worried that Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas will be weakened and collapse, and that Hamas will take over the Gaza Strip after the Israeli disengagement.

Perhaps Rice and Israeli officials should consider whether it is the disengagement itself that will lead to Abbas’ collapse, because it will be a victory claimed by Hamas.  Last month, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah, reported on the reaction of the Palestinian public to the disengagement:

"[W]hen we asked them why is Israel doing it . . . the unequivocal answer of the Palestinian public is because Israel is forced to.  Sharon has been forced by violence to pull out from Gaza.  Three-quarters of the public believe this is a victory for armed struggle against occupation," said Shikaki.

Right now [Shikaki said], the people believe that violence has forced Sharon’s withdrawal plan, so Hamas is claiming the victory.  Since Abbas has spoken out against the militarization of the intifadah, he cannot claim the victory since the people are linking it to violence.  But Hamas can.

Here is an excerpt from Dennis Ross’s description of "Lebanon and Unintended Consequences" (pp 626-627 in “The Missing Peace:  The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace”):

Understandably, Barak sought to make withdrawal [from the security zone in southern Lebanon] look like Israel’s decision, made out of strength and conviction.  But Hizbollah had other ideas.

As Israel began to dismantle some of its outposts and turn over others to its proxy army, the Southern Lebanese Army (SLA), Hizbollah went on the offensive. . . .

As a logistical feat, [the withdrawal from Lebanon] was another source of pride for the Israeli military.  But in the region, particularly given the collapse of the SLA, the withdrawal looked like a defeat.

Suddenly, there was a new model for dealing with Israel:  the Hizbollah model.  Don’t make concessions.  Don’t negotiate.  Use violence.  And the Israelis will grow weary and withdraw.

It mattered little that Barak had announced his intentions a year in advance, or that Israel had no claims, no historical attachment, and most importantly, no Israeli settler presence in southern Lebanon, as it did in the West Bank and Gaza.  In a textbook case of unintended consequences, the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon fostered an environment supporting increased radicalism, not moderation.  Hizbollah was celebrated for forcing the Israelis out.

Hizbollah now has 12,000 rockets capable of hitting northern Israel.  How many will Hamastan have? 

Do you think the “successful” Israeli withdrawal from Gaza will lead to: (1) a third intifada on the West Bank, as the Hizbollah/Hamas model moves to the next stage of surrounding Israel; or (2) “a sense of confidence and trust between the Israelis and Palestinians as they look to a better future”?

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