The Second Winograd Report

The long-awaited second report of the Winograd Commission will be issued in Israel today, focusing on the conduct of the Second Lebanon War, particularly the disastrous ground invasion in the final days. 

Michael Oren, who fought with the IDF, writes in “Israel’s Lebanon Disaster” in the Wall Street Journal that “None of us understood the purpose of this last-minute offensive or, indeed, many of the government’s disastrous decisions during the war.”

Now, a year and a half later, veterans of the war are demanding that Prime Minister Ehud Olmert accept responsibility for its conduct — or risk unraveling the consensus on which Israel’s survival depends.

. . . Israeli forces were denied permission to invade Southern Lebanon and neutralize the katyusha rockets that were pummeling Israeli cities. . . . Only on Aug. 13, after a month of fighting and with a U.N. ceasefire already approved, did the government authorize a ground offensive into Lebanon. The operation achieved nothing, either militarily or diplomatically, and cost the lives of 33 Israeli troops. . . .

Israel lacks a constitution but is bound by an unwritten social contract. . . . Prime Ministers Golda Meir and Menachem Begin resigned in the aftermath of disappointing wars, though both were exonerated of incompetence. By ignoring these precedents, Mr. Olmert, whose culpability began before the war, when he appointed a defense minister devoid of military experience, threatens to break the contract.

It is not clear why Olmert remained in office after the release of the initial Winograd Report last year, which led the military Chief of State and the Minister of Defense to resign.  Here is what that report concluded about Olmert’s decision to initiate the war:

b.      The Prime Minister made up his mind hastily, despite the fact that no detailed military plan was submitted to him and without asking for one. Also, his decision was made without close study of the complex features of the Lebanon front or of the military, political and diplomatic options available to Israel. He made his decision without systematic consultation with others, especially outside the IDF, despite not having experience in external-political and military affairs. In addition, he did not adequately consider political and professional reservations presented to him before the fateful decisions of July 12th.

e. All of these add up to a serious failure in exercising judgment, responsibility and prudence.

All of this was on top of the disastrous Gaza disengagement — of which Olmert was the chief sponsor and cheerleader.

UPDATE:  Israel Matzav (Carl in Jerusalem) is live-blogging the release of the Winograd Report.  If the first report was insufficient for Olmert to resign, the second will not be sufficient either.

Michael Oren is the guest today on the excellent weekly ZOA Middle East Report, hosted by Lori Lowenthal Marcus and Steve Feldman, on WNWR 1540 AM at noon EST (listen live or later here).