Commentary posts Norman Podhoretz’s 37-page essay: “World War IV: How It Started, What It Means, and Why We Have to Win.”
Podhoretz argues that, just as Harry Truman established a policy of worldwide containment at the beginning of the Cold War (World War III) — a policy Walter Lippmann criticized at the time as a messianic “ideological crusade” — Bush has established a Bush Doctrine, with four pillars, to meet what will be a similar struggle.
The fourth pillar is a recognition that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict cannot be resolved absent the defeat of terrorism:
Bush seems to have realized that there was something bizarre about supporting the establishment of a Palestinian state that would be run by a terrorist like Yasir Arafat and his henchmen. Why should the United States acquiesce, let alone help, in adding yet another state to those harboring and sponsoring terrorism precisely at a time when we were at war to rid the world of just such regimes?
It was this principle that lead to Bush’s landmark June 24, 2002 speech, which endorsed the “vision” of a Palestinian state but conditioned U.S. support on “regime change” in the Palestinian Authority. Just as it was useless to negotiate with the Taliban, or Saddam Hussein, it was useless — and counterproductive — to negotiate with Yasser Arafat.
The Palestinians, however, appear to be hoping for regime change in Washington, rather than Ramallah. Last week, the Council on Foreign Relations posted an interview with Khalil Shikaki, a prominent Palestinian political expert and director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah:
Do you think the American position will change if Senator Kerry wins the presidential election?
. . . I think, on the one hand, the problem of Bush and his obsession with Arafat will change, and I hope this will make Washington more open-minded with regard to elections and the possibility of Arafat participating.
In general, the notion of regime change that the Bush administration has espoused with regard to the Palestinians, in the June 2002 speech, is a policy that has been very counter- productive. I hope that Kerry would be more rational in the way he addresses the question of Palestinian leadership. .
Lt. Col. Jonathan D. Halevi reports in a brief for the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs that Arafat is hoping for rehabilitation, a hope that “has many sources:”
According to diplomatic officials, the Quartet is thinking of reintroducing Arafat into Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations after the U.S. elections, despite longstanding U.S. and Israeli opposition to such a move.
French President Jacques Chirac noted at a June NATO summit that Arafat was “probably the only person who could impose compromise on the Palestinian people.”
Furthermore, former President Bill Clinton told the Guardian on 20 June 2004 that Arafat is so influential in the Palestinian territories that America and Israel have no choice but to work with him if they want Mideast peace.
Step one in the rehabilitation of Arafat is the defeat of the author of the Bush Doctrine and the election in his place of John (“astonished we’re not picking up near where we left off at Taba“) Kerry.